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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy. Housed at Georgetown University Law
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic
diseases to health care financing and health systems. The Institute, a joint project of the Law
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the
Kennedy Institute of Ethics.
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global,
national, and local communities. By contributing to a more powerful and deeper
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decisionmakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives.
•

Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys,
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor. The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural,
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems.

•

Scholarship. O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems,
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a
scientific endeavor.

•

Reflective Problem-Solving. For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent
and knowledge that resides in academia.
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OVERVIEW
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern. In order
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health
reform. In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management,
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised. Due to the diverse interests involved, these
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates. Therefore, it is critical that
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform. In an effort to
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate. While other academic and research
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health
reform. The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other
key players. This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.

LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policybased and those that are legally-based. Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and
cannot be considered in isolation. However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or
prohibition.
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services. In contrast, legal issues are
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict.
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning
with, “Can we…?” The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?” This
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat
of political debate. This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems
addressed are either soluble or avoidable. Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or
make recommendations among them. Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for
resolving those questions.

LEGAL ISSUES
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press,
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal
health reform. After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten. An initial framing paper was drafted which identified
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each. In May of 2008, a
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and
framing of the legal issues. The attendees of the consultation session included congressional
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide
range of interests affected by health reform. Feedback and analysis from this session further
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current
law.
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is
adopted, the system changes. In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute
INTRODUCTION:
Health insurance mandates have been a component of many recent health care reform proposals.
Because a federal requirement that individuals transfer money to a private party is
unprecedented, a number of legal issues must be examined. This paper analyzes whether
Congress can legislate a health insurance mandate and the potential legal challenges that might
arise, given such a mandate. The analysis of legal challenges to health insurance mandates
applies to federal individual mandates, but can also apply to a federal mandate requiring
employers to purchase health insurance for their employees. There are no Constitutional barriers
for Congress to legislate a health insurance mandate as long as the mandate is properly designed
and executed, as discussed below. This paper also considers the likelihood of any change in the
current judicial approach to these legal questions.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:
• Congress's Authority to Regulate Commerce: The federal government has the
authority to legislate a health insurance mandate under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. A federal mandate to purchase health insurance is well within
the breadth of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce. Congress can avoid
legal challenges related to the 10th Amendment and states’ rights by pre-empting state
insurance laws and implementing the mandate on a federal level. If Congress wants
states to implement a federal mandate, it has the following two options:
 Conditional Spending: Congress may condition federal funding, such as that for
Medicaid or public health, on state compliance with federal initiatives.
 Conditional Preemption: Congress may allow states to opt out of complying with
direct federal regulation as long as states implement a similar regulation that meets
federal requirements.
• Congress’s Authority to Tax and Spend for the General Welfare: Congress also has
the authority to legislate a health insurance mandate under its Constitutional authority to
tax and spend. There are no plausible Tenth Amendment and states’ rights issues arising
from Congress’s taxing and spending power. However, Congress’ taxation power cannot
be used in a way that burdens a fundamental right recognized in the Constitution’s Bill of
Rights and judicial interpretations by the U.S. Supreme Court. Since there is no
fundamental right to be uninsured, no fundamental rights challenge exists.
• Other Relevant Constitutional Rights: Challenges under the First and Fifth
Amendments relating to individual rights may arise, but are unlikely to succeed. The
federal government should include an exemption on religious grounds to a health
insurance mandate as an added measure of protection from legal challenges based on
religious freedom. In the alternative, the federal government can simply exempt a federal
insurance mandate from existing federal legislation protecting religious freedom.
• Considerations: To avoid a heightened level of scrutiny in any judicial review, the
federal government should articulate its substantive rationale for mandating health
insurance during the legislative process.
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LEGAL ISSUES & APPLICABLE LAW:
• Commerce Clause: Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, including
local matters that substantially affect interstate commerce. Health care and health
insurance both affects and is distributed through interstate commerce, giving Congress
the power to legislate an insurance mandate using its Commerce Clause powers.
• Taxing and Spending Power: Congress has the power to tax and spend for the general
welfare. It can use its taxing power to implement a “pay or play” model to tax
individuals that did not purchase insurance or provide tax benefits to those that do
purchase insurance. Congress can also use its spending powers to influence state action.
The taxing power of the federal government can be limited if a tax intentionally and
directly burdens the exercise of a fundamental right.
• Federalism: The 10th Amendment and principle of state sovereignty in the Constitution
prohibit the federal government from commanding the states to implement federal law or
policies that would interfere with state sovereignty. This is referred to as the “anticommandeering” principle. A federal employer mandate covering state and local
government workers appears consistent with existing Constitutional decisions but still
might be susceptible to challenge under the Tenth Amendment.
• Individual Rights: The First and Fifth Amendment contain provisions that may have
some bearing on a health insurance mandate.
 Free Exercise of Religion: The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause protects
the free exercise of religion. In addition, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) prevents the federal government from enacting a law that substantially
burdens an individual’s exercise of religion, unless the government has a
compelling interest.
 Due Process and Takings Clauses: The Fifth Amendment includes two relevant
provisions. The Due Process Clause guarantees that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Takings Clause states
that the government may not take an individual’s property without just
compensation.
CONCLUSION:
The Constitution permits Congress to legislate a health insurance mandate. Congress can use its
Commerce Clause powers or its taxing and spending powers to create such a mandate. Congress
can impose a tax on those that do not purchase insurance, or provide tax benefits to those that do
purchase insurance. If Congress would like the states to implement an insurance mandate, it can
avoid conflicts with the anti-commandeering principle by either preempting state insurance laws
or by conditioning federal funds on state compliance. A federal employer mandate for state and
local government workers may be subject to a challenge; however, such a challenge is unlikely
to be successful. Individual rights challenges under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
or RFRA are unlikely to succeed, although a federal insurance mandate should include a
statement that RFRA does not apply or provide for a religious exemption. Fifth Amendment
Due Process and Takings Clause challenges are also unlikely to be successful. The legal analysis
presented is likely to endure, as the Supreme Court’s current position and approach to
interpreting relevant constitutional issues appear to be stable.
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform:
The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance
Mark A. Hall 1
Introduction
A. Background
Many proposals to reform health care finance and delivery require individuals or private
employers to pay for private health insurance. Senators Ron Wyden and Robert Bennett’s
Healthy Americans Act, for instance, would require every adult person who is not covered by a
public program to purchase health insurance. Similarly, President Obama’s campaign proposal
requires that parents arrange for coverage of their minor children and that all but small
employers pay a tax if they do not provide their workers health insurance.
This paper addresses the constitutionality of such proposals. Compulsory health insurance might
raise constitutional concerns because there is no existing social legislation that serves as a perfect
legal analogy to an individual mandate for private health insurance. Insurance mandates are
familiar in other contexts, such as automobile liability, but they present an easier case for
constitutionality2 because they are a condition of exercising a privilege, such as driving a car.
The requirement that workers contribute to Medicare and Social Security retirement is closer, but
this requirement is imposed as a tax rather than a purchase mandate. Other mandates such as
immunizations or attending school have well-established validity, but they rely on sufficiently
different justifications that are not particularly strong as precedents.
A direct and unconditional federal requirement for an individual to transfer money to a private
party for health or economic purposes seems to be unprecedented. There are abundant examples
of prohibiting such a transfer, say for the purchase of illegal drugs or gambling or money
laundering, but no examples of requiring a purchase other than as a regulatory condition (e.g.,
building code requirements under environmental laws and the Americans with Disabilities Act).
Possible approaches to compulsory health insurance differ in many specifics – from the
populations covered to subsidies and waivers to the means of enforcement. This paper focuses
on mandating individuals to purchase private insurance, but it also applies to employer mandates.
The paper assumes that people with low income or few assets would receive some type of
government subsidy, but that the subsidy might not be generous enough to avoid any potential
for financial hardship. We also assume that such mandates are enforced through financial
penalties, such as tax assessments or, at most, civil fines, but not through criminal law that would
result in imprisonment (or probation), absent some other criminal act (such as tax fraud or
evasion).
B. Summary of Analysis
An individual (or employer) mandate to purchase private health insurance raises several possible
constitutional issues. This paper focuses mainly on U.S. Constitutional law applied to a federal
mandate, but the second half (part II) also applies to state mandates and might be relevant under
state constitutions (depending on their particular wording and jurisprudence).
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We first explore whether compulsory health insurance falls within any recognized federal
legislative powers. Although the Constitution does not confer plenary powers over public
welfare like those possessed by the states, a mandate to purchase health insurance appears to fall
fairly readily within the current breadth of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
Also, if the sole means used to enforce compulsory insurance is the federal tax system, then this
requirement would easily fall within Congress’s broad powers over taxation. Moreover, under
Congress’s broad power to spend to promote the general welfare, it could require states to adopt
an insurance mandate as a condition for receiving health-related federal funding. There are no
plausible federalism objections to any of this as long as state and local governments are not
required to purchase insurance for their own employees, but even that requirement appears to be
consistent with current Supreme Court precedents.
This paper next examines whether either a federal or state mandate would violate individual
liberties. There is no support in Supreme Court decisions for a constitutional objection based on
religious liberty, but a statutory objection might be made under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), unless Congress provided a conscientious objector opt-out or unless it
expressly overrode RFRA’s application to compulsory health insurance.
Under the Due Process Clause, no Supreme Court decision since 1935 has struck down any state
or federal legislation for infringing economic liberties, and any such action would be radically
inconsistent with current constitutional doctrine. A plausible challenge might be made, however,
under the Takings Clause (which prohibits taking private property for “public use” without
paying "just compensation"), but such a challenge is not likely to succeed. There is no solid
precedent that applies the Takings Clause to mandated purchases of any kind. To succeed, one
would need to convince the Court that the Takings Clause applies to fungible money and that
mandating a private purchase constitutes a government taking. These positions are inconsistent
with some previous Court decisions. Moreover, a Takings Clause challenge could easily be
avoided by framing the mandate as a taxation provision (i.e., simply a tax benefit for complying
or a tax levy for not complying).
Finally, the paper explains why the major contours of this constitutional jurisprudence appear to
be secure, and not likely to shift substantially based on the current or future composition of the
Court.
Accordingly, the paper concludes that either state or federal mandates for either
individuals or employers to purchase health insurance will pass scrutiny under the U.S.
Constitution. Still, challenges to some versions of compulsory health insurance would be
possible. Therefore, the safest versions – those least susceptible to challenge – would be
mandates that: 1) contain explicit findings about effects on and in interstate commerce; or 2) are
conditioned on federal spending or federal taxation; and 3) avoid state and local government
employers; and 4) provide a religious exemption or exception from RFRA.
I. Federal Power to Legislate an Insurance Mandate
The first question is whether a mandate to purchase health insurance is within the constitutional
powers of the federal government. The federal government, of course, has limited powers. It
can legislate only under one of the authorizations enumerated in the Constitution. Notably
absent is any general police power or any reference to public health and safety, powers that
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traditionally are exercised by the states. Two federal possibilities exist: 1) the Commerce
Clause, and 2) the power to tax for the general welfare. Also, these powers might be limited by
the federalism or “states’ rights” concerns expressed in the 10th Amendment.
A. The Commerce Clause
1. Current Law
Under the Commerce Clause, “Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce . . . among
the several states . . . .” 3 Originally, the Court interpreted interstate commerce to mean only the
movement of goods or services across state lines, or transactions between people in different
states. Since 1937, however, it has been firmly settled, and the Court has said repeatedly that the
Commerce Clause also includes local matters that substantially affect interstate commerce. 4
This expansive stance was affirmed most recently and prominently in Gonzales v. Raich 5, which
held that the Commerce Clause confers power to prohibit the use of marijuana for medical
purposes, even when it is grown at home and consumed personally. Citing earlier precedents,
the Court used the deferential “rational basis” test to conclude that this “regulation is squarely
within Congress' commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home
consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the
national market for that commodity.” 6
The Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 7 emphasized, however, that even under our
modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress' regulatory authority is not
without enforceable bounds. Lopez is one of two 5-4 decisions authored by Justice Rehnquist
that set subject matter limits on federal power for the first time in 60 years, explaining:
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the interstate
commerce power “must be considered in the light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government. 8
Each of these limiting cases, though, is restricted to criminal laws that address non-economic
activity. In Lopez the Court struck down a federal law mandating a gun-free zone around public
school campuses because it was “a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. .
. . . It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise
out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.” 9 In United States v. Morrison, 10 the Court invalidated
the portion of the Violence Against Women Act that created civil liability for gender-based
violent crimes. The Court explained that both in Morrison and in Lopez, "the noneconomic,
criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision." 11
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2. Application to Compulsory Health Insurance
It is manifest that health insurance deals with economic transactions and substantially affects
interstate commerce. Although much of health care delivery is local, most medical supplies,
drugs and equipment are shipped in interstate commerce. Accordingly, the antitrust laws, for
instance, have been applied repeatedly to local hospital and physician activities. In Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 12 the Court held that allegations of the “combination of
factors” just noted “is certainly sufficient to establish a ‘substantial effect’ on interstate
commerce” under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Even more directly relevant is that most health insurance is sold through interstate companies.
All of the largest insurers in the country operate on a multi-state basis. Although in many states
the largest insurer is a locally owned and operated Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan, these Blues
plans contract with each other to accept Blues subscribers from any state into their provider
networks.
Regardless of how insurance is sold, it is well-established that matters relating to insurance
substantially affect interstate commerce. 13 In 1945, the Court (overruling its earlier precedent)
ruled that insurance was interstate commerce subject to federal regulation. 14 In response,
Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act 15 to declare that federal regulation of insurance is
not to be inferred or assumed unless federal laws do so explicitly.
Mandating health insurance directly affects interstate commerce in several ways. Covering more
people is expected to reduce the price of insurance by addressing free-rider and adverse selection
problems. Free riding includes relying on emergency care and other services without paying for
all the costs, and forcing providers to shift those costs onto people with insurance. Adverse
selection is the tendency to wait to purchase until a person expects to need health care, thereby
keeping out of the insurance pool a full cross section of both low and higher cost subscribers.
Covering more people also could reduce premiums by enhancing economies of scale in pooling
of risk and managing medical costs.
Thus, absent any special states’ rights concerns under the 10th Amendment (discussed below), it
is clear and well-settled that Congress has the power to mandate the purchase of health
insurance. To be extra safe, in view of Rehnquist-Court decisions (such as Lopez and Morrison)
Congress should make an explicit jurisdictional statement with express findings on the
substantial effects that an insurance mandate is expected have on or in interstate commerce.
B. General Welfare
Rather than a direct mandate enforced by civil fines, Congress might instead impose a tax on
people who do not have health insurance, as Massachusetts has done, or provide a tax credit or
other benefit for those who do have health insurance. Structured this way, the “mandate” would
not be a direct regulation; instead, it would impose indirect regulatory effects from a specially
crafted tax law. This alternative to a mandate is frequently distinguished as a “play or pay”
option: either employers or individuals play by purchasing insurance, or they pay a tax. Another
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approach might be to require states to adopt their own versions of compulsory health insurance,
as a condition for receiving federal funding.
These two approaches implicate Congress’s power under the Constitution “to lay and collect
taxes . . . and provide for the . . . general welfare of the United States.” 16 The Court has held
numerous times that this part of the Constitution confers not only the power to tax, but also the
power to spend in order to enhance the general welfare of the population.
1. Taxation Power
One of the seminal decisions that ushered in the modern era of constitutional law upheld
mandatory contributions to the Social Security Act system based on Congress’s power to tax for
the general welfare. 17 A “play or pay” approach that uses tax laws to require private health
insurance differs somewhat from Social Security contributions, but this approach still is wellsupported by federal constitutional precedents.
It is often said that the power to tax is “plenary,” meaning that, in general, Congress or the States
can tax or exempt whatever or whomever or however much they want, subject to only
diminishingly few limitations. 18 There was a time when the Court invalidated tax laws that had
primarily a regulatory rather than a revenue-generating purpose. For instance, it struck down a
federal tax on products shipped in interstate commerce that were manufactured using child
labor. 19 But, the Court long ago overturned or abandoned these precedents and concepts. 20 In
1937, the Court explained that “Every tax is in some measure regulatory. . . .But [it] is not any
less a tax because it has a regulatory effect. . . . Inquiry into the hidden motives which may move
Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of the
courts.” 21 Thus, challenges to tax laws succeed only when taxes directly or intentionally burden
the exercise of fundamental rights. 22 As noted below, there is no fundamental right to be
uninsured.
2. Spending Power
Congress may also use its power to spend to encourage states to adopt desired laws. This
approach, which allows greater flexibility among states and accounts for varying local or
regional conditions, has been used before in federal health care legislation. 23 Following it,
Congress could withhold health care funding for programs such as Medicaid or public health if
states did not adopt insurance mandates.
According to constitutional scholars, the “Court still almost routinely upholds intrusions that
would almost certainly be invalidated if imposed by direct regulation, when couched as
conditions to eligibility for federal funds. . . . The Supreme Court has never held a conditional
grant to state or local governments to be unconstitutional.” 24 For instance, in South Dakota v.
Dole, 25 the Court upheld a federal law that withheld highway funds to states that did not raise
their legal drinking age to 21.
The only potential limits, recognized but never enforced in modern times, are that the financial
penalties not constitute “compulsion,” and that they be logically related to the required law. 26
Scholars puzzle over when penalties might be coercive, but they generally conclude that the
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Court “seems a long way” from finding that this limit has been exceeded. 27 Nevertheless, it
would be prudent, if Congress were to follow this legislative approach, to make explicit findings
about the reasonableness of the funding penalty relative to the harms to federal interests caused
by a state’s failure to legislate.
C. Federalism Limits
1. Current Law
The Tenth Amendment reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.” 28 For many decades, this provision had no obvious independent force, since it was
viewed merely as the “truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.” 29
In the last two decades, though, the Court has set forth an important limit on federal power based
on this text or on the general federalism principle of respecting states’ sovereignty that is built
into the Constitution’s structure as a whole. In New York v. United States, 30 the Court struck
down, on 10th Amendment grounds, a federal law that required states to take title to any
radioactive waste within their borders that was not properly disposed of within 10 years, and that
made states liable in damages for harms caused by such waste. The Court in Printz v. United
States, 31 applied the New York case to find that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
violated the 10th Amendment because it required state and local law enforcement officials to
conduct background checks on people purchasing handguns. The key concern was that the Act
“forced participation of the State’s executive in the actual administration of a federal program . .
. .” 32
These decisions and the related federalism concerns have been interpreted as prohibiting only
what has come to be called “commandeering,” that is, commanding state officials to implement
federal laws and policies or otherwise directly invading state sovereignty. 33 When Congress
“does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to . . . enact any laws or regulations, and
it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private
individuals,” the Court has ruled that there is no federalism constraint on Congressional power.34
Thus, since the 1930s, the Court has never set 10th Amendment limits on Congress’s exercise of
its power to tax or power to spend. In modern times, the 10th Amendment to date has been used
to limit only Congress’s regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause.
2. Application to Compulsory Health Insurance
No commandeering element is needed in a federal mandate for private health insurance since this
would not require state implementation. Instead, Congress could simply pre-empt state
insurance laws, as it now does through ERISA. However, Congress might prefer state
implementation for federalism reasons expressed in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and to better
reflect varying local conditions. If so, Congress would need to find some means to induce states
to act.
There are two recognized approaches: conditional spending and conditional pre-emption.35
Using the first approach, the previous section explains that Congress could condition the receipt
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of relevant federal funds on states enacting complying legislation. Using the second approach,
Congress could simply allow states with complying laws to opt out of pre-emption and direct
federal regulation. The Court in New York v. United States 36 stated that, “where Congress has
the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized
Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to Federal
standards or having State law preempted by Federal regulation.” 37
For instance, Congress has used conditional pre-emption in HIPAA, which applies a federal
“fall-back” or default law to states that do not enact laws providing for guaranteed issue and
portability of group health insurance (among other requirements). Although the constitutionality
of this part of HIPAA has not been challenged, it is widely regarded as a successful balance of
federalism concerns. 38
The remaining federalism concern is whether Congress could apply an employer mandate to
state and local government employers. The answer appears to be uncertain. The Court in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 39 overruled a prior decision to hold that state and
local government employees are subject to federal minimum wage and overtime laws. However,
the Court did not provide a helpful conceptual framework for a 10th Amendment analysis.
Instead, it held in Delphic fashion that "we need go no further than to state that we perceive
nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA … that is destructive of
state sovereignty …” 40
Although it is impossible to know how extensive this precedent is, mandating employee benefits
appears indistinguishable from mandating wage levels, and therefore is supported by Garcia.
Still, considering the closeness and narrowness of this decision, the change in Court membership
since then, and the emergence of new federalism limits in subsequent Court opinions, it is
possible that a federal law mandating states or municipalities to fund health insurance for their
employees could be challenged on 10th Amendment grounds.
II. Individual Rights
This part considers challenges to compulsory health insurance based on individual rights
protected by the 1st and 5th Amendments. Because the 14th Amendment incorporates these and
other Bill of Rights’ amendments, the analysis in this part applies to both state and federal
legislation.
A. First Amendment
One potential basis for an individual-rights challenge to compulsory health insurance is a
religious objection under the 1st Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Although an insurance
mandate does not require anyone to use medical care, the Supreme Court has been willing to
assume that some religions (e.g., the Amish) have a conscientious objection even to having
insurance. 41 Nevertheless, state laws are valid despite violating religious faith as long as they
have general applicability and there is a rational basis for covering both religious and nonreligious practices. 42
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Thus, both states and the federal government may constitutionally mandate health insurance.
However, the legal environment for the federal government is clouded by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 43 Under RFRA, “the Federal Government may not, as a
statutory matter, substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, ‘even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability,’” unless there is a compelling reason and the least
burdensome means is used. 44
It is open to debate whether an insurance mandate would satisfy RFRA’s strict scrutiny. Prior to
RFRA, the Court in U.S. v. Lee, 45 found compelling justification to require Amish employees to
contribute to Social Security, but this was based in large part on the concern that the “tax system
could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.” 46 Here, we are
contemplating the mandatory purchase of private insurance, which differs significantly from a
general tax in its need for uniformity.
Recently, the Court held that RFRA “requires the Government to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’ –
the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” 47 A
more general interest in uniform application and administrative efficiency suffices only if the
government offers “evidence that granting the requested religious accommodations would
seriously compromise its ability to administer the program.” 48 This is a demanding standard.
Therefore, to be safe, a federal mandate should either provide for some form of religious
exemption (as the Healthy American’s Act currently proposes), or declare that RFRA does not
apply, or both. Congress, of course, is constitutionally free to enact exceptions or modifications
to its own statutes.
B. Fifth Amendment
The 5th Amendment reads: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” 49 We will separately address the Due Process and the Takings Clauses.
1. Substantive Due Process
Requiring someone to spend money they don’t want to spend could be viewed as a deprivation of
property or liberty, which the 5th Amendment allows only with “due process.” In the “Lochner
era” of constitutional jurisprudence (which began with the infamous Dred Scott decision), the
Court regularly struck down economic and social regulation for lack of due process when it felt
that sufficiently compelling reasons for the laws were lacking. For instance, the Court held that
maximum hour, minimum wage, and child labor laws were all unconstitutional because they
infringed economic liberties, despite justifications relating to health among others. This
“substantive due process” approach has not been followed since 1937, however.
In modern times, substantive due process does not apply to general economic and social rights.
Instead, it is limited to special areas of concern, such as procreation, marriage, bodily integrity,
and other rights “deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the United States.” 50 Absent
restriction of such “fundamental rights,” laws affecting general economic and social rights meet
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due process requirements if they are minimally rational, which means the law is one conceivable
way to advance a legitimate governmental goal. This standard is so lenient that “the Court has
not invalidated an economic regulation on substantive due process grounds since 1937.” 51
There is no fundamental right to be uninsured. Even at worst, if complying with an insurance
mandate was to leave someone destitute or bankrupt, substantive due process does not reach
these situations. 52
The Supreme Court has stated or assumed that the right to refuse medical treatment is a protected
liberty interest. 53 Similarly, the right to seek medical care might conceivably be framed as a
specially protected liberty interest. 54 This liberty interest, in turn, conceivably could form the
basis for protecting a right to purchase health insurance in order to afford treatment. 55 However,
the issue here is just the opposite: an imagined right to decline insurance, which implicates only
economic interests. Because having insurance does not require anyone to use it, an insurance
mandate should not implicate interests in either bodily integrity or decisional autonomy related
to health care.
This leaves us with the very lenient rational basis test, which a health insurance mandate easily
meets. It is not necessary for Congress to find that compulsory insurance is the only or the best
or the least restrictive way to achieve its goals, only that one can reasonably imagine a scenario
under which the law is not arbitrary and capricious.
A reasonably close precedent is Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 56 which upheld a state law
requiring a prescription in order to replace existing lenses or refit them into new frames.
Opticians who challenged the law argued that there was no need for a new prescription simply to
replace frames or duplicate a broken lens. The Court disagreed, explaining that “the legislature
may have concluded that eye examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision but
also for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that every change in frames and every
duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical expert.” 57 Even if
this imagined justification was half-baked or largely unsupported, the Court reasoned that it was
good enough for due process purposes stating,
[the] law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for
the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the
new requirement. . . . It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and
that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way
to correct it. 58
2. Taking of Private Property
Could an insurance mandate also be regarded as a government “taking” of private property
without “just compensation”? There are no modern or other precedents that apply the Takings
Clause to this or analogous situations, and there is at least one modern precedent (discussed
below) that rejects a similar application. Nevertheless, the issue is sufficiently clouded that it
bears more detailed analysis.
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a. Is Money “Property”?
First, is money “property” under the Takings Clause? Certainly money is property for most
purposes, but there are surprisingly few takings cases that apply to money or its equivalents.
Taxes take money every day for public uses, but they are not subject to the Takings Clause.
Still, there are a few Supreme Court Takings cases that reach money, most notably, those that
deal with interest earned on lawyers’ trust accounts (IOLTA funds). Because of technicalities
that prevent interest on trust accounts accruing either to lawyers or to their clients, most states
require that these interest earnings be turned over to a non-profit foundation set up by the state
Bar to fund indigent legal services. The Supreme Court held that these IOLTA funds constitute
private property for purposes of the Takings Clause. 59 (However, a subsequent decision held
that no compensation was owed because clients did not suffer an economic loss in losing funds
they were not entitled to earn in the first place. 60)
Still, the Court has never squarely held that generic money qualifies as property for purposes of
the Takings Clause. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 61 a fractured set of opinions appeared to
restrict the IOLTA-type precedent to discrete, ear-marked accounts, rather than to the taking of
money generally. Apfel addressed the federal Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, which
required current or former coal companies to fund health insurance benefits for retired coal
workers. No one opinion garnered a majority, but the plurality (the one with the most votes,
authored by Justice O’Conner and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas) struck down
this law as a taking (for reasons described below). However, the five other Justices disagreed (in
two different opinions) that a takings characterization fit these facts. Instead, they applied a
substantive due process analysis. Among this five, only Justice Kennedy found a due process
violation. Although the Act was invalidated, there was no one controlling rationale, and
paradoxically there were at least five votes against each of the separate rationales used to reach
this result.
This splintering makes it difficult to interpret Apfel, but several scholars read it as five members
of the Court rejecting the proposition that ordinary (fungible) money constitutes property for
takings purposes. 62 Because the decision was not clear and it was only narrowly decided, it is
probably not safe at this point to rest solely on this rationale.
b. Is Compulsory Purchase a “Taking”?
Even if money is property, is a mandate to purchase private insurance a government “taking” of
the purchaser’s money? Arguably not. Some constitutional scholars believe that the Takings
Clause should be restricted to situations where the government uses the assets taken, not where it
merely regulates their use by private parties. 63 This “government usings” position, however, has
not been endorsed by the Supreme Court. Instead, it was rejected explicitly by Justice Kennedy
in his lone opinion in Apfel, and implicitly by the plurality of four. Although Kennedy rejected
the plurality’s takings analysis (for the separate reason that money is not property), he briefly
noted his disagreement with this argument. 64
Even if requiring people to purchase their own private insurance might conceivably be regarded
a “taking for public use,” this certainly is not a classic, overt, or per se taking. Instead, the Court
would regard this as a potential “regulatory taking.” When the government regulates the use of
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property, the Court applies a set of factors to determine whether the regulation is severe enough
to constitute a taking. These factors include the magnitude of the economic impact, how it is
distributed across other property owners, and the extent to which the regulation interferes with
the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations. 65
Under these factors, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Apfel found that an employer
mandate to fund retiree health benefits was a regulatory taking. The Court felt that the law
unfairly imposed an enormous obligation on a former coal company to pay for the future health
benefits of long-ago retired workers, even after the company was no longer in the mining
business.
Although the Apfel case nominally relates to health insurance, it bears little resemblance to
requiring individuals to purchase health insurance for themselves or requiring employers to do
so for current employees. Instead, it appears to be the quintessential situation of hard facts
generating a decision that, if not “bad,” at least is not expansive.
In any event, the other five Justices disagreed with the plurality’s takings analysis, and the Court
rejected a similar challenge in an earlier decision that dealt with pension plan liability. 66
Moreover, our situation differs significantly from Apfel. Compulsory insurance would apply to
most people and so not impose hugely disproportionate burdens on a few. Under an individual
mandate, people would receive something of value in return for their money, which dampens the
economic impact. An employer mandate gives the employer nothing concrete in exchange, but
unlike Apfel, which focused on health benefits for retirees of a company that had left the
industry, an employer mandate presumably at least “buys” the employer some good will and
morale among workers. In short, compulsory insurance is very far afield from any scenario in
which the Court has come close to finding a “regulatory taking.”
c. Summation
The analytic landscape of takings jurisprudence is complex and confusing, so it is difficult to see
one’s way clearly. The Takings Clause is the most plausible way to express the basic libertarian
instinct that opposes the government forcing someone to spend their money on something they
feel they don’t want or need. Yet if the Takings Clause were to apply here, it would create
innumerable problems and puzzles to ponder in all realms of social and economic regulation and
taxation. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a takings challenge would succeed, yet it is
surprisingly difficult to reject it outright.
In the end, perhaps it is not necessary to find a single definitive rationale for rejecting a takings
challenge. Some Justices may think that the Clause does not apply to money, others may think it
does not apply to mandated purchases, and others that the burdens of purchasing health insurance
do not rise to the level of a regulatory taking. In the end, there is no good precedent in favor of
this application, and one close precedent (Apfel) opposed. As Justice Breyer summarized in
Apfel (in dissent to the result, but agreeing with Justice Kennedy on the takings issue):
The “private property” upon which the [Takings] Clause traditionally has focused
is a specific interest in physical or intellectual property. It requires compensation
when the government takes that property for a public purpose. This case involves
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not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an ordinary liability to pay
money, and not to the Government, but to third parties. 67
But lest we forget, Apfel struck down an employer mandate for retiree health insurance. Even
though no single rationale prevailed, a combination of takings and substantive due process
doctrines resulted in a rare invalidation of economic legislation. Therefore, some scholars read
Apfel as a possible revival of Lochner-type thinking. 68 Even if takings law is not the particular
doctrinal route chosen, Apfel illustrates that Lochner-type results can emerge from a fragmented
court via the convergence of multiple reinforcing rationales under the 5th Amendment – even
when a majority of the court rejects each particular rationale. Still, Apfel is a unique case, one
that is thought to apply mainly to situations of retroactive liability for past activity. Also, either a
due process or a takings challenge can be avoided fairly readily by framing any purchase
mandate as a tax penalty or benefit.
III. The Stability of Existing Precedents
So far this paper has addressed Constitutional law as it currently stands, but how stable is this
law? According to prominent academic scholars, there is a notable intellectual movement,
branches of which are known variously as the “Constitution in Exile” or the “Lost Constitution,”
that could dramatically reshape constitutional doctrine. 69
These reformers would either restore some of the judicial approaches that prevailed prior to 1937
or give much more teeth to parts of the Constitution they believe are neglected (such as the 9th
Amendment, the Contract Clause, or the Privileges or Immunities Clause). Through whichever
route, the legal effect would be to strengthen substantially the constitutional protection of private
property and economic liberties. 70 If some or all of these views were to prevail among a
majority of the Court, the legal analysis outlined so far might change significantly, or even
radically. This final section evaluates the likelihood of such a transformative shift in
constitutional law.
The two Supreme Court cases most directly on point are Helvering v. Davis, 71 which upheld the
constitutionality of the social security system as a legitimate use of Congress’s general welfare
power to tax and spend, and Williamson v. Lee Optical, 72 which rejected a due process challenge
to a state law that required a prescription in order to replace eyeglass frames or duplicate existing
lens. Both cases are still firmly considered to be good law, and have been cited approvingly in
modern times by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, among others. More generally, the
Roberts Court so far has not reversed a single Constitutional precedent nor has it struck down
any laws for exceeding congressional powers. Therefore, a dramatic change in course does not
appear likely.
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts are too new to the Court to reliably assess their views
about these transformative ideas. However, the positions of Justices Kennedy, Scalia and
Thomas are well established. Only Justice Thomas appears willing to accept many of the
transformist positions about federal powers. Justice Kennedy’s positions are much more centrist
on the extent of federal powers, and his judicial approach is more cautious about overturning
established precedents. 73 The views of Justice Scalia, who sometimes is more outspoken, merit
more attention.
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There is good evidence that Justice Scalia is not likely to join or lead the transformist movement.
He is firmly on record as opposing both the expansion of substantive due process and the radical
retraction of interstate commerce jurisdiction. The scope of interstate commerce was the central
issue in Gonzales v. Raich, 74 which permitted the government to outlaw “medical marijuana” in
California. Concurring, Justice Scalia interpreted Congressional power to reach even farther
than recognized by the majority. He said that
the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate
commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate
commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do
not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce. 75
Also, he approvingly cited and quoted from leading historical precedents that expanded interstate
commerce jurisdiction (Darby and Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.), and he gave restrictive
readings to the more recent limiting precedents in Lopez and Morrison. 76
As to substantive due process, just prior to joining the Court, then-Judge Scalia had this to say:
The Supreme Court decisions rejecting substantive due process in the economic
field are clear, unequivocal and current, and as an appellate judge I try to do what
I'm told. But I will go beyond that disclaimer and say that in my view the position
the Supreme Court has arrived at is good or at least that the suggestion that it
change its position is even worse. 77
Since then, he (joined by Justice Thomas) has termed substantive due process an "oxymoron"
rather than a "constitutional right" and declared his belief "that the Due Process Clause
guarantees no substantive rights, but only (as it says) process." 78
Some reputable scholars have articulated coherent constitutional theories that might prohibit
government from mandating health insurance, 79 but these theories are inconsistent with
prevailing constitutional jurisprudence, including that of Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice
Scalia, in particular, is an intellectual leader among the judicial wing most concerned about
expansion of federal powers. If he is not willing to embrace dramatic restrictions in federal
powers or expansions in economic liberties, it is unlikely that these views will gain a majority
footing in the Court any time soon. Therefore, the major outlines of constitutional law described
in this paper appear to be stable.
IV. Summary of Legislative Options
Based on this extensive analysis of Supreme Court decisions and jurisprudence under the U.S.
Constitution:
•

Either state or federal government may require either individuals or employers to pay for
health insurance. States have inherent power to promote health and provide for the
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general welfare. The federal government has authority under its power to regulate
interstate commerce.
•

Government may also use a “play or pay” approach that imposes tax penalties on
employers or individuals for failing to purchase insurance. A play or pay option is a bit
safer because it would avoid any realistic possibility of attacking compulsory insurance
as a denial of due process or an unjustified taking of property. However, such challenges
to an outright mandate would be contrary to existing law and therefore not likely to
succeed in any event.

If the federal government prefers to give states flexibility to use different approaches to
accomplish an insurance mandate, it may do this either through:
•

Conditional spending, that is, requiring states to adopt an insurance mandate in order to
receive federal funding for health-related programs such as Medicaid, or

•

Conditional pre-emption, that is, imposing a federal requirement as a default provision
that states can opt out of by adopting a different approach that complies with the same
objective.

Whichever approach a government chooses, it should articulate its substantive rationales in order
to avoid any possibility of heightened scrutiny that calls the social, economic, or legal
justification into question.
These major points of constitutional law appear to be firmly established and are not likely to
change based on the near-term composition of the Court. However, there are two smaller areas
of potential constitutional concern:
•

If the federal government were to impose an employer mandate that covered state and
local government workers, this might be subject to a challenge under the 10th
Amendment, which protects states’ sovereign prerogatives. Although current law
appears squarely against such a challenge, this is an area where the Court might modify
current precedents.

An individual mandate by the federal government could be challenged by those with religious
objections. Although the Constitution provides no basis for such a challenge, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) might. Therefore, a federal mandate should either contain an
exception for conscientious religious objection or should expressly override RFRA.
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